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Abstract
We consider a directed search environment where capacity constrained sellers
reach uncoordinated buyers through costly advertising while buyers observed
all prices probabilistically. We show that: (i) the equilibrium advertising
intensity has an inverted U-shape in market tightness, (ii) the equilibrium
advertising intensity is higher under an auction mechanism than under posted
pricing, and (iii) the equilibrium price and measure of informed buyers may
be positively correlated even in large markets.
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1 Introduction
The presence of trading frictions have become increasingly recognized as being
an important feature of many markets. The directed search paradigm has recently
received an extensive recognition in the literature as a natural progression from
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the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework to capture these trading frictions.1
While the matching technology proposed in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides is
exogenous and relates to market tightness, the directed search framework consid-
ers a strategic environment. Capacity constrained sellers typically post prices, and
uncoordinated buyers make choices over sellers to trade with. This environment
generates an endogenous matching function. The equilibrium matching function
depends on market tightness as well as on the vector of prices posted by one side
of the market. Another important feature of directed search, is that it can generate
multilateral matches, allowing the study of a richer set of trading mechanisms than
the traditional Generalized Nash Bargaining used in pairwise matching models.2
In standard directed search models, two basic and very important assumptions
are maintained: (i) posting price is costless, and (ii) buyers can perfectly observe
all posted prices.
In practice posting prices is costly. Sellers often use marketing channels or
public media to inform buyers about their posted prices and locations.3 Moreover,
the observability of advertisements (hereafter ads) sent by sellers is not perfect.
In other words, not all ads sent by sellers reach all buyers.4 Typically a buyer
only observes a subset of all posted prices. Under these circumstances, what kind
of pricing and advertising strategies will sellers adopt, if sellers can only reach
buyers through costly advertising and buyers randomly observe prices? Does
the equilibrium advertising intensity depend on the particular pricing mechanism
used by sellers? Are the results from the directed search literature robust to costly
advertising and imperfect information structures? How do equilibrium prices and
advertising intensities vary with changes in market tightness? Are equilibrium
advertising intensities efficient ?
In order to answer these questions, we consider an environment where sellers
inform buyers about their prices through costly advertising while buyers stochas-
tically receive ads from sellers. Sellers are capacity constrained and buyers are
1Canonical models of directed search include among others, Peters (1984, 1991, 2000), Mont-
gomery (1991), McAfee (1993), Julien, King and Kennes (2000, 2008), Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001),
Shi (2001, 2005) and Shimer (2005). Our findings also relate to Competitive Search Models, Simer
(1996), Moen (1997), however we discuss on the potential limitations in Section 6 of the paper.
2The Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides focus on pairwise matching matching and bargaining.
Earlier decentralized purely random matching models also had this feature. Among others, see
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1995).
3Large expenditures on advertising are a commonly observed throughout many industries.
4This may be because of the limited attention span of buyers, their time constraints or simply
the cost of reaching all consumers is too costly.
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uncoordinated.5 We first consider an economy populated by homogeneous sellers
each trying to sell one unit of an homogenous goods to ex-ante identical buyers.
Each seller chooses price (or reserve price if the sales mechanism is auction) and
advertising intensity that determines the probability by which a particular buyer
receives her ads. Since the advertising technology is stochastic, not all buyers
receive the same number of ads. After each buyer receives the ads, she then
chooses one seller to visit and trade with. Finally, if a seller meets buyers (possibly
multiple), the good is sold at the posted price (under price-posting mechanism) or
through ex-post bidding (under auction mechanism). In this environment we then
characterize the symmetric advertising equilibrium in an economy with a finite
number of buyers and sellers. Then, we use the limit property of the finite equilib-
rium to study the equilibrium properties of the large market economy where the
numbers of buyers and sellers are infinite.
For the large market, we find that the equilibrium advertising intensity has
an inverted U-shape with respect to market tightness (buyer-seller ratio). This
inverted U-shape implies that, for the information to have a large measure of
informed buyers (market transparency), the number of market participants needs
to be relatively balanced. Specifically, if the buyer-seller ratio is relatively low
(small consumer base), the intense price competition amongst sellers prevents
any particular seller to invest in advertising as the additional benefit is very low.
Conversely, if the buyer-seller ratio is relatively high (large consumer base), sellers
do not have enough incentive to invest in advertising given the ease to match
with at least one buyer. We show precisely how the equilibrium inverted U-shape
results from sellers’ profits maximizing, and from the properties of equilibrium
expected revenue and cost. Schmalensee (1989) and Bagwell (2007) find that the
inverted-U shape relation between advertising intensity and market concentration
is a stylized fact in industrial organization. We are one of the first studies to provide
a theoretical explanation for this empirical regularity.6
We also show that the equilibrium matching rate for a seller in the large econ-
omy is the same as in the traditional directed search framework in that it only
depends on the buyer-seller ratio. In this sense, the equilibrium prices found in
the standard models are robust against the imperfect observability and the costly
advertising. This property also implies that the equilibrium price only depends on,
and is strictly increasing in the buyer-seller ratio. Combining this result with our
findings on equilibrium advertising intensity, the equilibrium price and number
5In the spirit of directed search, we keep these two assumptions throughout the paper.
6The findings also generate more empirical question and specifications. For instance, are the
empirical findings on inverted U-shape robust to markets with capacity constrained sellers?
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of informed buyers (market transparency) can have positive or negative correla-
tion when changing the buyer-seller ratio. When the buyer-seller ratio is small,
the equilibrium price and advertising intensity are both low. Price competition
is very intense, and the resulting lower prices only generate small amount costly
advertisements. Increasing the buyer-seller ratio shows induces a large positive
marginal impact on expected revenue, justifying an increase in advertising inten-
sity. This positive correlation between equilibrium price and measure of informed
buyers, those who receive ads, has also been shown by Lester (2011) but for finite
markets only.7 Here we find this effect but in a large market for relatively low
buyer-seller ratio and the number of informed buyers is endogenous. When the
buyer-seller ratio is large, the equilibrium price is high, but advertising intensity
is low. Increasing the buyer-seller ratio has a small positive marginal impact on
expected revenue, and sellers’ response is to lower advertising. This generates a
negative correlation between equilibrium price and market transparency as per
the conventional wisdom.
In this paper, we also compare the equilibria from two trading mechanisms:
auction and price-posting. For the large market, we find that the equilibrium
advertising intensity under auction is higher than the one under price-posting, and
holds for any values of the buyer-seller ratio. Under an auction mechanism, the ex-
post competition between buyers allows sellers to enjoy full surplus. Thus, sellers
are concerned with the probability of attracting at least two buyers which gives
higher incentive for sellers to advertise more. Under a price-posting mechanism,
sellers only care about the probability of attracting at least one buyer. However,
since the equilibrium price and probability of trade only depends on buyer-seller
ratio, sellers have the same expected revenue under both mechanisms. Sellers will
then have higher advertising levels when an auction is used as the trading protocol.
Julien, Kennes and King (2001, 2002) showed that auction beats price-posting in
the finite economy but sellers are indifferent between these two mechanisms in
the large economy. Here clearly, sellers would be better off under price posting in
large markets, and hence, our finding contrasts with the previous conclusions in
the directed search literature with perfect observability of prices.
Finally, we analyze the efficiency properties of equilibria. We show that in
general, efficiency cannot be achieved simultaneously at the intensive (advertis-
ing) and extensive margin (entry). Efficiency is possible whenever the market is
balanced, that is, for equal number of buyers and sellers. Furthermore, depending
7Lester (2011) has exogenous number of informed and uniformed buyers about prices, for a
range of informed buyers, increasing the fraction of informed buyers lead to higher equilibrium
prices. However, his result only holds in finite markets not in large markets.
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on parameter values, efficiency on one margin can only be achieved, either the
intensive or the extensive.
The work closes to this paper is that of Menzio (2007) who studies the cheap-
talk information transmission in a competitive matching market. A continuum of
heterogeneous sellers send ads which contain the information about their produc-
tivity. Every buyer observes all ads and choose which seller to visit. Sellers do not
commit to the information they send but can choose how informative their ads are.
Menzio (2007) finds that the informativeness of advertising is “inverted U-shape”
in market tightness. In our environment, sellers commit to the information they
send and the advertising intensity affects the reach of buyers. We provide more
details on the connection of our paper to the literature in Section 6.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
basic environment and specifies the information structures, players’ beliefs and
strategies as well as the equilibrium concept. In section 3, we characterize the equi-
librium outcome in the finite economy, then we explore the limit properties of this
equilibrium as an exact-equilibrium in the large economy. Section 4 characterizes
the equilibrium under the alternative price-posting mechanism. We compare the
equilibrium advertising intensities under different mechanisms. Section 5 studies
the efficiency properties while section 6 relates the findings of our paper to the
previous literature. The final section offers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider an economy populated by M sellers and N buyers. We denote the
sets of sellers and buyers byM andN , respectively. The ratio of buyers to sellers,
φ = N/M, represents the corresponding market tightness.
Each seller owns one unit of the homogeneous good. The reservation value to
sellers is normalized to be zero. Each buyer is ex-ante homogenous and demands
one unit of the homogenous goods. Both sellers and buyers are risk-neutral. If a
buyer purchases the good at price p, his net payoff is 1 − p. If a seller sells at price
p, her profit is simply p.
Sellers inform buyers about their prices through costly advertising while buyers
stochastically receive ads from sellers. Buyers who receive at least one advertise-
ment from sellers will be referred as informed buyers from now.
Game structure. When the market opens, sellers simultaneously and indepen-
dently choose (reserve) prices and advertising intensities. All informed buyers
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then simultaneously and independently choose which seller to visit. The visiting
decision is irreversible even if the buyer eventually does not obtain the goods.
Buyers who are uninformed do not participate in the market.
If sellers and buyers meet, the seller uses a certain mechanism to allocate the
good. We consider two mechanisms in this paper: first-price auction and price
posting.8 The auction mechanism captures the fact that in a wide range of markets,
sellers have only limited ability to commit to the posted price. When there is only
one buyer visiting a particular seller, the terms of trade is given by the posted
reserve price. However, when there is more than one buyer visiting a particular
seller, the seller can let the buyers compete for her good.
Advertising. The advertising technology we adopt is in the spirit of Butters (1977)
and Grossman and Shapiro (1984) so that ads stochastically attract buyers. Ireland
(1993) and Eaton, McDonald and Meriluoto (2010) allow for target advertising so
that sellers can choose the fraction of buyers who will receive ads. In this paper
we do not consider this technology as advertising has an important stochastic
component. In our model, each seller chooses an advertising intensity q ∈ [0, 1] so
that each buyer has probability q to receive ads from this particular seller. Under
stochastic advertising, a seller who spends lots of resources on advertisements
might not be able to attract many buyers, though the possibility of this event is
very small.
Advertising, sending signals to buyers, is costly. The cost of advertising, C(q),
is convex so that C′(q) > 0, C′′(q)≥0. Moreover, the cost also has the following
properties C(0) = 0, C(1) > 1, C′(0) = 0 and C′(1) = ∞. The advertising cost does not
depend on the market tightness φ.9 The advertising technology is consistent with
modern marketing channels such as portal-site advertising, television advertising
and vacancy-posting on online matchmakers.10
Example. Consider a constant-reach, independent readership (CRIR) advertising
technology. A seller can place ads in any set of websites. Assume that each website
has a readership of x in the population. Then a fraction x of the population
8The auction mechanism was introduced into matching environment by Peters and Severinov
(1997), Peters (1997) and Julien, Kennes and King (2000). The price-posting mechanism was
discussed by Peters (1984, 1991, 2000) and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001).
9In Butters (1977), the urn-ball matching advertising requires the probability of reaching a
buyer to be decreasing in the total number of buyers, holding the resource devoted to advertising
fixed. This advertising technology prevails in those traditional mailbox advertising and phone-call
advertising where the consumer reach depends on the investment per capita.
10For instance, in labor markets, the advertising cost of a firm depends on the number of job-
hunting sites it posts its ads but not the number of potential job seekers.
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is exposed to an ad published in any given website. If a seller places ads in s
websites, the probability that a given consumer will see none of these ads is then
(1−x)s. The reach of such an advertising campaign is q = 1− (1−x)s. Equivalently,
we can write the number of websites in which ads must be placed to achieve a
reach of q as s = ln(1 − q)/ ln(1 − x). Suppose each website charges y for posting
ads. Then, in order to reach each buyer with probability q, the seller must incur
the following cost
C(q) =
y ln(1 − q)
ln(1 − x) . (1)
Note that this advertising technology satisfies all conditions we previously as-
sumed.
Information structure. The number of sellers and buyers as well as the character-
istics of the homogenous good are public knowledge. Thus although buyers might
not know the exact number of market participants, they hold a rational estimate.
Before the market opens, a representative buyer lacks the following informa-
tion: (i) the prices charged by each seller, (ii) where each seller is located and
(iii) the advertising intensity of each seller. Restrictions (i) and (ii) on consumers’
information set makes sellers’ advertising essential. A trade can only take place
after a buyer knows the location and price the seller is going to charge. If con-
sumers a priori know sellers’ location, they may conduct random search even if
they do not receive any ad. We rule out this possibility.11 Assumption (iii) is useful
because despite the fact that consumers usually do not know the exact advertis-
ing input of each seller, the ability to perfectly predict the advertising level on the
“off-equilibrium paths” can lead to the non-existence of pure-strategy equilibrium.
While all buyers are ex-ante homogeneous, the stochastic advertising endoge-
nously creates heterogeneity among buyers. Buyers may receive a different num-
ber of ads. Moreover, these ads may come from different sellers. Therefore, we
use information set I to describe the buyers’ information prior to the selecting
game. A buyer’s information depends on how many ads a particular buyer re-
ceives. Each ad contains a seller’s name, her location and the reserve prices she
charges. We then have that I ∈ RM+ , where the ith argument is the reserve price
ri ∈ [0, 1] charged by seller i. If a buyer does not receive ads from seller j, we
assume the jth argument in her information set is infinity and this seller will never
be selected. For example, if a buyer observes only seller 1’s ads, her information
set is {r1,∞, ......,∞}. For any information set I, we use |I| ≤ M to denote the
number of arguments in Iwhich are non-equal to∞. We refer |I| as the size of I.
11Random search dilutes the essentiality of advertising and an autarky equilibrium may emerge.
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Beliefs and strategies. When each seller can only provide limited supply, ad-
vertising intensity affects not only sellers’ profits but also buyers’ payoffs. A high
advertising intensity tends to attract more buyers and therefore reduces the proba-
bility of trade for all attracted buyers. Let us denoteµ : [0, 1]M → [0, 1]M the buyers’
beliefs. Note then that µ(·) maps a buyer’s information set to the set of all sellers’
advertising intensities. Thus, µ j(·) denotes the conjectured level of seller j’s adver-
tising intensity. A belief system is said to be passive ifµ j(I) = qˆ,∀ j ∈ M,I ∈ [0, 1]M
for some qˆ ∈ [0, 1].
A seller’s pure strategy is (p, q) ∈ [0, 1]2. A buyer’s strategy is a mapping from
his information set and belief to a distribution over the observed sellers: σ(I, µ)
where σ j(I, µ) is the probability to select seller j and
M∑
k=1
σk = 1. If seller j is not
observed, σ j = 0.
We impose two further restrictions on buyers’ strategies:
Anonymity: If r j, rk ∈ I and r j = rk, then σ j = σk.
Symmetry: If there exists a one-to-one correspondence η : M → M such that
r j = rη( j) where r j ∈ I and rη( j) ∈ I′, then σ j(I, µ) = ση( j)(I′, µ) for all j ∈ M.
These two restrictions are modified from the standard ones to accommodate im-
perfect observability.12 Anonymity requires that if a buyer observes two sellers
charging the same reserve price, she should choose them with the same proba-
bility. Symmetry requires that if a one-to-one correspondence can be constructed
between two information sets I and I′ so that r j in I equals to its image, say r′k inI′, then the selecting probability over seller j when the information set is I equals
to the selecting probability over seller k when the information set is I′.
Equilibrium. Throughout this paper, we focus on an equilibrium where the
advertising intensity is strictly positive. The formal definition of the equilibrium
is given by Definition 1.
Definition 1 A Symmetric Advertising Equilibrium (SAE) is a triplet
{
(r∗, q∗), σ∗(I, µ), µ}
such that:
(i) Given buyers’ common belief µ and the symmetric selecting strategies σ∗(I, µ), all
sellers use symmetric strategies (r∗, q∗) to solve (20);
12In standard directed search models with perfect observability, anonymity requires buyers to
select two sellers with the same probability if they charge the same price. Symmetry requires that
two buyers have to use the same selecting strategy since they always observe the same set of prices.
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(ii) A buyer with given information setI and beliefµ, uses strategy σ∗(I, µ) to maximize
his expected payoff;
(iii) The equilibrium advertising intensity q∗ coincides with the common passive belief qˆ;
(iv) The equilibrium advertising intensity is strictly positive: q∗ > 0.
3 Advertising Equilibrium
We use backwards induction to solve for the equilibrium. Consider the final stage
where the auction takes place. In a match with seller i, a buyer also observes the
total number of buyers showing up at seller’s i location. Her bidding strategy
depends on the reserve price, ri, and the number of buyers showing up, ni. Since
there is no information asymmetry in the bidding stage, simple reasoning, as in
the Bertrand competition, gives the optimal bidding strategy
b(ri,ni) =
ri if ni = 1;1 if ni > 1. (2)
The profit that seller i receives is then given by
pii(ri,ni) =

0 if ni = 0;
ri if ni = 1;
1 if ni > 1.
(3)
Notice that under an auction mechanism, multi-lateral matching leads to zero
consumer surplus. Whenever there is more than one buyer selecting seller i, seller
i extracts all the surplus from selling the good.
3.1 Buyers’ decision
In the selecting stage, an informed buyer is trading off between the probability of
trade and the price. A low price may attract more buyers and therefore increase
the risk of not trading. Similarly, if a seller is suspected to have high advertising
intensity (holding other factors constant), visiting this seller is less attractive. This
is the case as this seller will tend to have more buyers competing for the good.
When signals sent by sellers are imperfectly observed by buyers, her choice is more
complicated than the standard directed search one. To better establish a buyer’s
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selection problem, we first analyze a case where M sellers compete for two buyers,
buyer 1 and 2, and extend this analysis to the N-buyer case later.
If buyer 1 receives ads only from seller i, she has no choice but to select seller i
no matter what she thinks of buyer 2’s choice. Now suppose buyer 1 receives at
least two ads including the one from seller i. If buyer 1 is the only visitor at seller
i, she can get 1− ri. However, if buyer 2 also shows up at seller i, buyer 1 gets zero
payoff. Thus, buyer 1’s expected payoff of visiting seller i is given by
U1i = (1 − ri)Pr[being alone at seller i]. (4)
To assess the probability of being alone at seller i, buyer 1 needs to consider the
following: (i) whether buyer 2 receives ads from seller i; if so, the number of
sellers observed by buyer 2 (buyer 2’s information set); and (ii) given buyer 2’s
information set, the selected strategy used by buyer 2. We can write the probability
of being alone at seller i as follows
Pr[being alone at seller i] = P0 + P+, (5)
where P0 is the probability that buyer 2 does not receive ads from seller i, and P+ is
the probability that buyer 2 observes ri but chooses not to select seller i. Buyer 1’s
beliefs about seller i’s advertising intensity is µi(I1), P0 = 1 − µi(I1). To compute
the probability P+, we need to take into account all possible formations of buyer
2’s information set. P+ is given by
P+ = µi(I1)
1 −
∑
I2 s.t.
ri∈I2
σi(I2, µ) ·
∏
rj∈I2
j,i
µ j(I1) ·
∏
rk<I2
(1 − µk(I1))
 . (6)
Seller i is the only potential deviator. Therefore, the reserve price charged by seller
i is the only possible observed price which is different from buyer 1’s expected
level. The conjecture about other sellers’ advertising intensities should not be
affected by the deviation of seller i. Thus these are held at some fixed level qˆ in the
symmetric setting. In addition, the anonymity and symmetry assumptions imply
that buyer 2’s strategy only depends on the size of her information set. Thus,
equation (6) can be simplified to
P+ = µi(I1)
1 −
∑
I2 s.t.
ri∈I2
σi(I2, µ) · qˆ|I2|−1 · (1 − qˆ)M−|I2|
 . (7)
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From the 2-buyer case, it is clear that buyer 1’s expected payoff depends on her
own beliefs about the deviator’s advertising intensity and buyer 2’s strategy. Note
that the term in the bracket of (7) can be understood as the expected probability
that buyer 2 does not visit seller i conditional on receiving ads from seller i. To
further simplify the exposition, we define the second term in the bracket of (7) as
Λi which can be understood as any other buyer’s information set. In a symmetric
environment, Λi is determined by the deviating price ri, the non-deviating price r
and the belief system µ. Thus
P+ = µi(I1) [1 −Λi(ri, r, µ)] . (8)
We are now ready to extend buyer 1’s reasoning to a N-buyer setting. We
still analyze from buyer 1’s perspective and assume she receives ads from the
deviator, seller i. Let Λ ji (ri, r, µ) denote buyer 1’s assessment of buyer j’s choice,
conditional on buyer j receive ads from seller i. The probability that buyer 1 is the
only one who receives seller i’s ads is P0 = (1 − µi(I1))N−1. In the N-buyer case,
P+ is interpreted as the probability of the event where someone other than buyer
1 receives seller i’s ads but none of them select seller i. From now on, we omit the
arguments in Λi. To compute this aggregate probability P+, the following events
and the corresponding probabilities to be considered are the following:
1. only one other buyer observes ri, but does not visit i which occurs with
probability µi(I1) (1 − µi(I1))N−2 ∑
j∈N\{1}
(1 −Λ ji );
2. two other buyers observe ri, but neither of them visit i which occurs with
probability (µi(I1))2 (1 − µi(I1))N−3 ∑
j,k∈N\{1}
(1 −Λ ji )(1 −Λki );
n. ......................................................;
N-1. all other N − 1 buyers observe ri, but none of them visit i which occurs with
probability (µi(I1))N−1(1 −Λ2i ) · · · (1 −ΛNi ).
Buyer 1 does not observe other buyers’ information set. Therefore, any two
buyers are viewed as the same from the point of view of buyer 1. That is Λ ji =
Λki = Λi,∀ j, k , i. Under symmetry, a buyer’s selecting strategy does not depend
on the specific information this buyer receives but the size of his information set.
This is the case given that the deviation of seller i is observed. That is
∀I,I′ such that ri ∈ I,I′ and |I| = |I′|, then σi(I, µ) = σi(I′, µ). (9)
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Given the fact that the selection strategy only depends on the size of information
sets, all events included in Λi can be further classified into M − 1 cases. The
expression of Λi is then
Λi(ri, r, µ) =
M−1∑
k=0
(
M − 1
k
)
· qˆk · (1 − qˆ)M−k−1 · σi(I, µ | |I| = k + 1) (10)
where σi(I, µ | |I| = k + 1) is the conditional probability of selecting seller i when
the information set I (ri ∈ I) and the size of the information set is k + 1. Thus we
can conclude that the probability that buyer 1 is alone at seller i, conditional on
that he observes ri and holds the belief µ, is
P0 + P+ =
N−1∑
n=0
(
N − 1
n
)
·(µi(I1))n·(1 − µi(I1))N−1−n·(1 −Λi)n = (1 − µi(I1)Λi)N−1 . (11)
Then, the expected payoff from visiting seller i is
Ui = (1 − ri) (1 − µi(I)Λi)N−1 . (12)
From now on, as in the directed search literature, we focus on the subgames
where buyers use mixed strategies when selecting sellers. Similarly as we have
done in the previous analysis, define Λ as the expected probability that a seller
visits a seller other than i contingent on him receiving the seller’s ads. A buyer
who receives both deviator and non-deviator’s ads uses mixed strategies only if
visiting these sellers yields the same expected payoffs. That is
(1 − ri) (1 − µi(I)Λi)N−1 = (1 − r) (1 − qˆΛ)N−1 , (13)
where r is the symmetric reserve price charged by all non-deviators. If a buyer
observes m > 1 prices, his strategy must satisfy
σi(I, µ) +
∑
k,i,k∈I
σk(I, µ) = 1 ∀Iwith |I| > 1. (14)
Since non-deviators are assumed to choose the same reserve price, they should be
treated equally when a buyer decides her visiting strategy. We then must have
σk(I, µ) = 1 − σi(I, µ)m − 1 , ∀rk ∈ Iwith |I| = m. (15)
When we combine (15) and the indifference condition (13), we derive Lemma
1 which is a market clearing condition.
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Lemma 1 The conditional expected probabilities of selecting the deviator, Λi and the
conditional expected probabilities of selecting a non-deviator, Λ, satisfy the following
condition:
µi(I)Λi(ri, r, µ) + (M − 1)qˆΛ(ri, r, µ) = 1 − (1 − µi(I)) (1 − qˆ)M−1 (16)
All proofs can be found in the appendices.
The relationship between the conditional expected probability, Λi and Λ is
intuitive. If we multiply both sides of (16) by the number of buyers, N, the left-
hand side of (16) is the expected number of active buyers in the market while the
right-hand side is the expected number of informed buyers. In our model, any
informed buyer will visit a seller, because visiting is costless. A buyer becomes
active if she shows up at some seller’s auction. Equation (16) says that the expected
number of active buyers in the market is equal to the expected number of informed
buyers. It is worth noting that I1 appears in both sides of (16). That is, the market
clearing condition is a subjective concept and holds for every buyer who observes
the deviating reserve price ri.
Combine the indifference condition (13) and the market clearing condition (16),
we can explicitly express Λi as
µi(I1)Λi = 1 −
 (M − 1) +
(
1 − µi(I1)) (1 − qˆ)M−1
(M − 1)
(
1−ri
1−r
) 1
N−1
+ 1
 . (17)
This probability in general hinges on the observed reserve prices ri and r and
the belief about the deviator’s advertising intensity µi and the belief about the
non-deviator’s advertising intensity, qˆ, which in turn depends on ri and r.
3.2 Sellers’ choice
In this section, we analyze sellers pricing and advertising choices. As seller i is the
only potential deviator, we focus on her incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
reserve price and advertising intensity. Seller i knows her own choice on ri and qi,
takes other sellers’ choices r−i and q−i as given, and also foresees buyers’ belief and
choice in the selection game. Thus, seller i’s maximization problem is
max
ri,qi
Πi = ri · Pr[ni = 1] + 1 · Pr[ni ≥ 2] − C(qi).
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It is clear that seller i extracts all the surplus only when there is more than
one buyer selecting her. The seller can earns the reserve price when only one
buyer selects her. Therefore, two probabilities, Pr[ni = 1] and Pr[ni ≥ 2] need to
be computed. One thing worth mentioning is that sellers use the same reasoning
as buyers. To seller i, the conditional probability that a buyer visits her given
that a buyer receives her ads is Λi. The difference is that seller i knows her true
advertising intensity qi and takes other sellers’ symmetric advertising intensities
q as given in a simultaneous move game. We now show that the two probabilities
above have simple representations. For ni = 0, the following events are included:
00. no buyer receives ad from seller i with probability (1 − qi)N;
01. one buyer receives ad from seller i, but he does not visit seller i with proba-
bility Nqi(1 − qi)N−1(1 −Λi);
0n. .............................................................;
0N. all buyers receive ad from seller i, but none of them visit seller i with proba-
bility (qi)N(1 −Λi)N.
Adding the probabilities of these events yields:
Pr[ni = 0] =
N∑
k=0
(
N
k
) [
qi(1 −Λi)]k (1 − qi)N−k = (1 − qiΛi)N . (18)
For ni = 1, the following events are included:
11. 1 buyer receives seller i’s ad and he visits seller i with probability Nqi(1 −
qi)N−1Λi;
12. 2 buyers receive seller i’s ad but only one of them visits seller i with proba-
bility N(N − 1)(qi)2(1 − qi)N−2[2Λi(1 −Λi)];
1n. .........................................................;
1N. N buyers receive seller i’s ad but only one of them visits seller i with proba-
bility (qi)NNΛi(1 −Λi)N−1.
Adding the probabilities of these events yields:
Pr[ni = 1] = qiΛi
N−1∑
k=0
(
N
k + 1
) (
k + 1
1
) [
qi(1 −Λi)]k (1 − qi)N−k−1 = NqiΛi (1 − qiΛi)N−1 .
(19)
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Given the derived probabilities, seller i’s maximization can be summarized by
max
ri,qi
Πi = 1 − (1 − ri)NqiΛi (1 − qiΛi)N−1 − (1 − qiΛi)N − C(qi)
s.t. Equation (17).
(20)
Seller i is maximizing her expected profit while her choice is constrained by buyers’
response in the selecting game.
Define τ = 1− (1− q∗)M as the equilibrium probability that a buyer is informed.
Proposition 1 gives the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric
advertising equilibrium (SAE) in a finite economy with auction mechanism.
Proposition 1 In a finite market where all sellers use first-price auction, a symmetric
advertising equilibrium exists. The equilibrium reserve price and advertising intensity
(r∗, q∗) are characterized by the following first-order conditions:
r∗ =
(φ − 1M )τ
(M − 1) + (φ − 1)τ, (21)
C′(q∗) = r∗
φτ
q∗
(
1 − τ
M
)N−1
+ (1 − r∗)φ(φ −
1
M )τ
q∗
(
1 − τ
M
)N−2
. (22)
When N ≥M + 1, the equilibrium is unique.
When the communication between sellers and buyers becomes perfect, that is
q∗ → 1, the equilibrium reserve price r∗ converges to the reserve price in standard
directed search models for finite markets.13 To have a clearer idea regarding the
equilibrium advertising intensity, we use CRIR cost function introduced in section
2 to plot the level set, or iso-advertising curves, and a three-dimensional graph of
q∗ = q(M,N) in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows that when the number of seller M is fixed
the advertising intensity is increasing with the number of buyers N initially, but
eventually decreasing.
3.3 Competitive matching equilibrium
Following the directed search literature we extend the finite number of partici-
pants analysis with to the large market environment by imposing that, M and N,
approach infinity while the market tightness φ is fixed.
13See Julien, Kennes and King (2000) for more on this.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium advertising intensities when x = 0.6, y = 0.4
To determine the large market equilibrium, we take the limit of the sellers’
payoff functions and construct their profit maximization problem, and compute
the equilibrium reserve price and advertising intensity in this large market. In this
environment, the limit of the solution in finite market coincides with the solution
to the limit payoff function.
Consider the payoff function in (20) and take the limit when M,N→∞, which
yields
Π = r
qiφ
qˆ
e
− qiφqˆ + (1 − e−
qiφ
qˆ − qiφ
qˆ
e
− qiφqˆ ) − C(qi). (23)
Notice that we do not need to consider the constraint in (20) anymore as the large
market property eliminates the competition effect between buyers. To choose the
optimal reserve price, equation (23) shows that seller i is doing a linear program-
ming problem. So r∗ should take value 0 or 1. However, the convergence property
and equation (21) implies r∗ = 0 for any q∗ ∈ (0, 1). For the equilibrium advertising
intensity we take the derivative with respect to qi in (23) and set qi = qˆ. We then
have the following condition
φ2e−φ = q∗C′(q∗). (24)
It is also easy to check that (22) converges to (24) the convergence of (21) that r∗ = 0.
Proposition 2 In the large market where M,N → ∞ and N/M = φ, the equilibrium
reserve price r∗ = 0 and the equilibrium advertising intensity is characterized by
φ2e−φ = q∗C′(q∗).
16
The equilibrium price and advertising intensity in the large market are the limits of the
corresponding ones in the finite market.
The equilibrium condition (24) can be rewritten as follows
φ2e−φ
q
= C′(q). (25)
The left hand side (LHS) of equation (25) is the marginal revenue of advertising
while the right hand side (RHS) is the marginal cost of advertising. Since the
reserve price converges to zero in the large market, a seller makes positive profit
only when there are at least two buyers selecting her. The marginal revenue thus
coincides with the additional probability of attracting more than two buyers by
increasing advertising intensity. This additional probability decreases as the ad-
vertising intensity increases. When sellers increase advertising, more consumers
become (partially) informed and obtain access to the market. Also, the infra-
marginal consumer is aware of more sellers and put less probability on visiting
each seller in their information set. The former effect unambiguously increases the
revenue of the seller and always dominates the later effect. However, the marginal
benefit diminishes as the prevailing advertising level increases in the market since
the number of inframarginal buyers is large.
A primary focus of the standard directed search model with perfect signals
is the correlation between the equilibrium price and the market tightness. With
auctions we show that reserve price goes to zero in the large market and therefore
has no correlation with the market tightness. The imperfect observability of signals
in our model gives rise to another interesting question: how does the equilibrium
advertising intensity change when market tightness increases? Or in other words,
does market transparency improve if there are more buyers available? Proposition
3 shows that the equilibrium advertising intensity is inverted U-shape in market
tightness. The advertising intensity is increasing when the number of buyers is
small relative to the number of sellers. After reaching a certain level of market
tightness, the advertising intensity starts to decrease.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium advertising intensity q∗ is of inverted U-shape in the
market tightness φ. In particular, when φ < 2, dq∗/dφ > 0 and φ > 2, dq∗/dφ < 0.
For illustrative purposes let us consider a linear cost structure where C′(q) = 1.
When the number of buyers is relatively small, sellers are less willing to invest in
advertising as the probability of attracting buyers is small. Let us now consider an
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Figure 2: Relation between q∗ and φ when x = 0.6 and y = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9.
increase of market tightness φ so that there are relative more buyers than sellers.
Having more buyers drastically increases the probability of making sales. Since
the stock of informed buyers for each firm is small, increasing advertising does
not significantly affect the profit from the marginal visitor. Hence, sellers increase
advertising level to inform more buyers in response to the change. When the
number of available buyers reach a certain level and the advertising intensity is
sufficiently high, maintaining the original advertising intensity yields a marginal
profit lower than the marginal cost. A seller only needs to attract two buyers.
When there is a very large number of available buyers, the marginal benefit of
advertising is low. Thus, a buyer reduces her advertising level after she is almost
assured that two buyers will visit her. Figure 2 plots the equilibrium advertising
intensities in the large market when cost function of advertising is CRIR. It is clear
from Figure 2 that advertising has an inverted U-shape.
4 Alternative Sales Mechanism: Price-Posting
When the trading protocol is an auction, sellers only partially commit to the
posted price. The ex-post bidding enables sellers to fully extract the surplus
whenever there is more than one buyer visiting a particular seller. However, in
many markets, after-matching haggling is not allowed and sellers fully commit to
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the posted price. This section explores these types of markets and determine how
robust are the results under the auction mechanism.
In this new environment, whenever there is local excessive demand (more than
one buyer visiting a seller), the allocation problem is solved by an equal-chance
rationing rule. Thus, both the seller and buyer can obtain positive surplus. This
kind of price-posting mechanism has been thoroughly analyzed in Peters (1984,
2000) and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) in environments where signals are costless
and perfectly observable to all buyers. By considering imperfect observability and
costly advertising, this paper asses the robustness of the results in the directed
search literature.
4.1 Advertising equilibrium
Sellers simultaneously choose the advertising intensity q and price p. A seller
will commit to her posted price no matter how many buyers select her. Then all
informed buyers independently choose which seller to visit. Finally, if n buyers
select a seller, a rationing rule assigns each buyer a probability of 1/n obtaining
the good. The advertising technology and belief formation are the same as in the
auction mechanism case.
Let us first consider a finite number of sellers and buyers. A seller always
makes profits p if she makes a sale. A buyer obtains surplus 1 − p if she buys the
good at price p. Now consider the buyers’ selection game. As in the previous
section we focus on symmetric equilibrium and treat seller i as the single potential
deviator. Then we only need to consider the problem faced by an informed buyer
who receives seller i’s ads. Call this agent ”buyer 1”. If seller i is the only seller
that buyer 1 observes, the problem is trivial as buyer 1 has no other choices but
selecting seller i. We assume buyer 1 observes at least another non-deviating
seller’s ads. Buyer 1’s trade-off in visiting seller i is between the price and the
probability of trade. As discussed in the previous section, the probability that any
other buyer showing up at seller i is given by µi(I)Λi, where µi the conjecture on
seller i’s advertising intensity and Λi is the conditional probability to select seller
i. Thus, buyer 1 should believe the probability of trading with seller i is given by
Ωi =
1 − (1 − µi(I1)Λi)N
Nµi(I1)Λi . (26)
Notice that the numerator of equation in (26) is the expected number of sales of
seller i, while the denominator is the expected queue length at seller i. Since each
buyer selecting seller i has equal chance to obtain the good, the probability of
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getting the good from seller i is just the expected number of sales of seller i divided
by the expected queue length at seller i. Then, buyer 1’s expected payoff from
visiting seller i is given by
Ui =
(1 − pi) [1 − (1 − µi(I1)Λi)N]
Nµi(I1)Λi . (27)
Similarly, we can write the expected payoff from visiting a non-deviating seller,
seller j, conditional on receiving ads from seller j. Seller j charges symmetric
equilibrium prices p and buyers’ conjecture of her advertising intensity is qˆ. The
expected payoff of visiting seller j is then
U j =
(1 − p)
[
1 − (1 − µ j(qˆΛ)N
]
NqˆΛ
. (28)
Since all sellers other than seller i are following a symmetric equilibrium strategy,
then the expected payoff from visiting any non-deviating seller, U, equals to U j.
Whenever buyer 1 receives at least two ads including seller i’s, she is assumed
to use a mixed strategy when selecting over all observed sellers. The induced
indifference condition is then given by
Ui = U. (29)
Combining this indifference condition with Lemma 1, we can solve for Λi in terms
of µi(I1),qˆ, pi and p. However, in order to solve for the equilibrium condition, we
do not need the explicit expression of Λi.
Let us now we study the seller’s pricing and advertising strategies. When sell-
ers commit to the posted prices, they only care about the probability of attracting
at least one visitor. This is the case as her profits do not change even if more than
one buyer visits her. For the potential deviator seller i, the profit maximization
problem is given by
max
qi,pi
pi
[
1 − (1 − qiΛi)N
]
− C(qi) s.t. U = Ui.
As in the last section, seller i’s choice is constrained by buyers selecting behavior.
Define ρ = 1− q∗Λ = 1− (τ/M) as the equilibrium probability that a buyer does not
choose a particular seller. Proposition 4 characterizes the symmetric advertising
equilibrium (SAE) in the finite market.
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Proposition 4 When the trading mechanism is price-posting in a finite economy, a sym-
metric advertising equilibrium (SAE) exists. The equilibrium price and advertising inten-
sity are jointly determined by
p∗ =
M(1 − ρN) − ρN−1(1 − ρ)MN
M(1 − ρN) −NρN−1(1 − ρ) , (30)
φτρN−1p∗ − q∗C′(q∗) = 0. (31)
It is worth noticing that the situation whereby every seller chooses (q, p) = (0, 0)
is not an equilibrium outcome even if it satisfies the previous conditions. Note
that when all other sellers choose (q, p) = (0, 0), a seller can choose a positive price
p and an arbitrarily small but positive advertising intensity q so that some buyers
will be informed. These buyers will select this seller with probability 1 as this
seller is the only seller in their information sets. Thus, the marginal revenue of the
deviator is strictly positive. This is a profitable deviation from (q, p) = (0, 0) given
the fact that C′(0) = 0. When every seller chooses q = 1 so that ρ = 1 − (1/M),
the market becomes perfectly transparent in the sense that every buyer observes
all posted prices in the market. Rearranging some terms, condition (30) can be
written as follows
p∗ =
(M − 1) − (M−1M )Mφ(M − 1 + Mφ)
(M − 1) − (M−1M )Mφ(M − 1 + φ)
. (32)
This is the equilibrium price derived in the standard directed search model with
price-posting.14
Similarly as in the last section with the auction mechanism, we explore the
large market property of the equilibrium price and advertising intensity. We
are especially interested in the relation between equilibrium advertising intensity
and market tightness, and also the comparison between the equilibrium advertis-
ing intensities under auction mechanism and under price-posting. Proposition 5
characterizes the large market equilibrium with price-posting and shows that the
inverted U-shape result still holds.
Proposition 5 When the trading mechanism is price-posting in the large market, the
unique equilibrium price and advertising intensity are characterized by
p∗ = 1 − φ
eφ − 1; , (33)
q∗C′(q∗) =
φe−φ(1 − e−φ − φe−φ)
1 − e−φ . (34)
14See Burdett, Shi and Wright, 2001, page 1071, equation 15.
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Figure 3: Comparison of equilibrium advertising intensities when x = 0.2 and
y = 0.6.
The equilibrium advertising intensity q∗ is inverted U-shape in market tightness φ.
Notice that the equilibrium price in the large economy coincides with the
equilibrium price in the standard directed search model, which is independent
of the equilibrium advertising intensity. As in the auction mechanism, when
the market tightness increases, the equilibrium advertising intensity increases
initially and eventually decreases. From Proposition 5, we also see that the market
tightness corresponding to the maximum advertising (φ = 1.669) is smaller than
the one under auction (φ = 2).
Proposition 6 Compared to the equilibrium advertising intensity in a market with auc-
tions, the equilibrium advertising intensity q∗ with price-posting market is always lower
for all market tightness φ.
Thus, Proposition 6 shows that sellers invest more in advertising under an
auction mechanism. When advertising has a CRIR cost function, Figure 3 plots
the equilibrium advertising intensities under both mechanisms.
In the large-market, the probability that a seller has at least one visitor is given
by
Pr[n ≥ 1] = lim
M,N→∞
[
1 − (1 − q∗Λ∗)N
]
= 1 − e−φ. (35)
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The probability that a seller has at least two visitor is given by
Pr[n ≥ 2] = lim
M,N→∞
[
1 − (1 − q∗Λ∗)N −Nq∗Λ∗(1 − q∗Λ∗)N−1
]
= 1 − e−φ − φe−φ. (36)
Then, the equilibrium revenue for a seller under auction mechanism is
ΠA = 1 · Pr[n ≥ 2] = 1 − e−φ − φe−φ. (37)
The equilibrium revenue for a seller under price-posting mechanism is
ΠP = p∗ · Pr[n ≥ 1] = 1 − e−φ − φe−φ. (38)
Therefore, sellers have the same expected profits regardless which mechanism,
auction or price-posting, is used. Following Proposition 6 we can establish the
following corollary.
Corollary 1 Compared to the market that has a price-posting mechanism, sellers in using
auctions have strictly lower expected profit.
4.2 Price and informed buyers
A large number of papers in the search literature, including directed search models
(Lester, 2011), noisy search models (Burdett and Judd, 1983), sequential models
with homogeneous products (Stahl, 1989) and sequential search models with dif-
ferentiated products (Anderson and Renault, 2000), have studied the relationship
between the equilibrium prices and measures of informed buyers. The conven-
tional wisdom suggests that prices should be lower the larger the proportion of
informed buyers. It is often argued that higher number of informed buyers inten-
sifies competition amongst sellers, thus reducing prices. This argument is derived
in Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Varian (1980), Burdett and Judd (1983), Stahl (1989)
among others. The key features that deliver the conventional wisdom are: (i)
products are homogeneous, (ii) uncertainty is only regarding prices, (iii) sellers
do not suffer from capacity constraints, and (iv) the market structure tends to be
oligopolistic.
Two exceptions worth mentioning are those of Anderson and Renault (2000)
and Lester (2011). Anderson and Renault (2000) analyze a duopoly sequential
search model with differentiated products where uninformed buyers do not know
their match values. In this environment uninformed buyers create a positive
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Figure 4: Co-movement of p∗ and q∗ when x = 0.6 and y = 0.8.
externality so that the price goes down when more uninformed buyers enter the
market. Lester (2011) on the other hand focuses on homogeneous products. In
Lester’s environment uninformed buyers can still participate through random
search while facing capacity constrained sellers. Informed buyers are directed
by posted prices. The author shows that in a finite market, an increase in the
fraction of informed buyers can cause prices to decrease, remain constant, or
even increase. These results critically depend on parameter values capturing the
fraction of uninformed buyers. However, in the large market, prices never increase
when the number of informed buyers increases.
Relative to Lester (2011) Anderson and Renault (2000), our analysis differs in
that the market number of informed buyers is endogenous. Corollary 2 shows that
when market number of informed buyers is endogenized, the equilibrium price
and number of informed buyers can positively co-move even for large markets.
Corollary 2 If advertising has a CRIR cost function then values for market tightness
such that φ ≤ 1.669, we find that p∗ and q∗ jointly increase as φ increases. When market
tightness is such that φ > 1.669, then p∗ increases but q∗ decreases as φ increases.
This result implies that when the market tightness is low, larger number of
informed buyers is associated with higher prices. Moreover, when the market
tightness is high, a larger number of informed buyers is associated with a lower
price.
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5 Efficiency
An important issue in the advertising literature is whether there exists over- or
under-advertising in equilibrium. In his seminal paper, Butters (1977) had a strik-
ing finding that the equilibrium advertising intensity is always socially optimal.
Subsequently, Stegeman (1991) and Stahl (1994) reported that the equilibrium
advertising is inadequate. All these models consider sellers with unlimited capac-
ity. An important application of the framework presented here are labor markets
where sellers (firms) have only limited capacities (vacancies). In this section,
we discuss the normative perspective of advertising in the presence of capacity
constraint.
5.1 Advertising efficiency without free-entry
We first consider a social planner whose objective is to maximize social welfare.
The social planner can potentially control both the advertising intensity and the
buyers’ entry.15 Buyers’ entry is costly. Each buyer incurs a sunk cost k > 0 to enter
the market. Within the context of the labor market, the entry cost can be thought
as costly education or an investment on skills.
After entering, each buyer may or may not receive ads from sellers. Once a
buyer receives at least one advertisement and therefore becomes informed, the
social planner can suggest him a seller in his information set to visit. However,
when making the recommendation, the social planner is also constrained by the
symmetry and anonymity constraints. This restriction on welfare maximization
is consistent with the notion of constrained efficiency in directed search litera-
ture. Finally, we assume that the social planner cannot affect buyers’ belief about
advertising intensities.
We assume that the auction mechanism is used in the market. Once a seller
is successfully matched with buyers, one unit of surplus is realized. The social
planner’s problem is then to maximize each seller’s matching probability while
taking both advertising cost and entry cost into account. We first consider the
case where the social planner can only control the advertising intensities and the
market tightness is fixed at φ. The social planner’s maximization problem is given
15The entry from seller (firm) side can be discussed in a fully specified labor market model.
After entry, firms post wages and send advertisements. An informed worker apply to all firms he
observes. Then each firm who receives at least one application chooses a work to offer. If a worker
receives multiple offers, he holds auction and let firms bid for his service.
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by
max
q
(1 − e− qφq∗ ) − C(q). (39)
Notice that here the passive belief is assumed to be the one consistent with the
equilibrium choice, µ j(I) = q∗,∀ j,I. The first-order condition yields
φ
q∗
e−
q†φ
q∗ = C′(q†), (40)
where q† is the efficient level of advertising.
Recall that the equilibrium advertising intensity q∗ under auction mechanism
satisfies
φ2e−φ
q∗
= C′(q∗). (41)
Proposition 7 compares the equilibrium level of advertising to the efficient level
under auction mechanism.
Proposition 7 When φ > 1, there exists excessive advertising, i.e. q∗ > q†. When φ < 1,
there exists inadequate advertising, i.e. q∗ < q†. When φ = 1, the equilibrium advertising
is also efficient, i.e. q∗ = q†.
5.2 Advertising efficiency with free-entry
Now we analyze the case where the buyer incurs an entry cost k ∈ (0, 1) to be
able to participate in the market. The social planner can control both advertising
intensities and the number of buyers entering the market. Since the entry is from
the buyer side, the total surplus can be calculated on the per seller basis. The social
planner’s problem is then to choose q and φ to do the following maximization:
max
φ,q
(1 − e− qφq∗ ) − C(q) − φk. (42)
The first-order conditions are
q†
q∗
e−
q†φ†
q∗ = k, (43)
φ†
q∗
e−
q†φ†
q∗ = C′(q†), (44)
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where q† and φ† are the efficient levels of advertising intensity and market tight-
ness.
Now consider an equilibrium with free-entry. After entry, a buyer’s expected
payoff is eφ if the market tightness is φ. The free-entry condition forces zero profit
to the potential entrants. That is
e−φ
∗
= k. (45)
whereφ∗ denotes the equilibrium market tightness with free entry. The equilibrium
condition of advertising is
(φ∗)2e−φ
∗
= q∗C′(q∗). (46)
Thus, sellers’ choice in a free-entry equilibrium, (φ∗a, q∗a), is characterized by (45)
and (46). Notice that equation (45) uniquely determines φ∗. Since the RHS of
the equilibrium advertising condition is strictly increasing, q∗a is also uniquely
determined. Now we can see if the equilibrium outcome (φ∗a, q∗a) can replicate
social planner’s solution (φ†, q†) which satisfies (44) and (43).
Proposition 8 In a free entry equilibrium, the market tightness and advertising intensity
will be both efficient only when k = 1/e.
6 Relation to the Literature
The advertising intensities in our model can in general be classified into the search
literature with explicit and endogenous search intensity. In the random match-
ing environment, several authors have discussed the role played by search effort
exerted by either sellers or buyers to form matches. For example, Shimer (2004),
in a dynamic setting, modeled the search intensity as a worker’s choice of the
number of simultaneous applications to make. Viianto (2009) considered a similar
search intensities from buyer side and showed the non-monotonic relationship
between the market tightness and the equilibrium search intensity. More closely,
Kaas (2010) considered an urn-ball matching with costly and continuous search
intensities chosen by sellers. However, the author did not focus on the relationship
between the search intensity and the market tightness.
We differ from previous work in that search is not random and informed buyers
are directed by sellers’ ads. Advertising, as one kind of search intensity, does not
obviously increase the probability of being matched in equilibrium as we have
shown. In contrast, high advertising intensity may lower the attractiveness of a
particular seller as the informed buyer expects more intense local competition.
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Besides the random matching literature, there has also been substantial effort
being devoted in incorporating search intensities into directed search models. Al-
brecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006) extend the standard directed search model to
a situation where workers can send multiple applications and buyers who receive
multiple offers run an auction to sell his service. Galenianos and Kircher (2009)
consider a similar setting but firms post wages and commit to them. Lester (2010)
studies a directed search model where each firm decides how many vacancies
to create. A firm with more vacancies attracts more applications. Each of these
departures from the standard model are one way to explicitly model search in-
tensities while still allow search to be directed. However, in these models the
search intensities are usually discrete variables. In contrast in our environment,
we model advertising intensity as the probability of reach which is continuous and
can alternatively be understood as a seller’s expenditure on searching. One of the
advantages of using continuous variables to model search intensity is the ease by
which the equilibrium can be analytically characterized. Further, discrete-choice
models are less convenient for estimation purposes, so that a continuous measure
for search intensities with differentiable cost function may be more appealing (such
an application can be found in Wolthoff, 2011).
In all of the previous papers, search intensities can be measured by mone-
tary expenditure. The more money an agent spends, the more applications a
worker can send or the more vacancies a firm can create. Menzio (2007) studies
the cheap-talk information transmission in a competitive matching market. A
continuum of heterogeneous sellers send ads which contain information regard-
ing their productivity. Every buyer observes all ads and choose which seller to
visit. Sellers do not commit to the information they send but can choose how
informative their ads are. Menzio found that unless the market tightness is not
too small or not too large, there exists an equilibrium where the content of com-
munication is positively correlated with the actual productivity. Otherwise the
equilibrium features only uninformative advertising. In other words, Menzio’s
model shows that the informativeness of advertising has an inverted U-shape in
market tightness. Moreover, buyers search randomly in equilibrium when the
market tightness is either too high or too low. In our model, sellers commit to the
information they send. But advertising intensity in our model affects the reach of
buyers. The inverted U-shape advertising intensity we derive gives an interesting
analogy to Menzio’s under a different setting of advertising. Informed buyers’
search are always directed for any market tightness as we exclude the possibility
for uninformed buyers to search randomly.
Our results also relate to the literature of competitive search that are now widely
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used in labor markets and search based models of money (see Shimer 1996, Moen,
1997 and Rocheteau and Wright, 2005). Competitive search models differ in that
sellers are assumed to take the maximum expected utility buyers can obtain from
selecting other sellers as given. Peters (2000) refers to this maximum expected
utility as “market utility” and the sellers are then constrained by the so-called
“market utility property”. In directed search as we consider in this paper, sellers
have explicit market power and the deviation by a seller affects the expected utility
a buyer can get from other sellers. However, it is well known that in the limit,
the market power vanishes and the allocations of competitive search and directed
search are equivalent.16 In our model, under the assumption buyers’ beliefs are
passive about advertising, the observed price deviation gives rise to the standard
trade-off on price and matching probability. Thus, as the market gets large, the
“market utility property” still holds in our analysis and our results applies to the
competitive search environments.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we consider a directed search model where buyers can not perfectly
observe prices posted by where sellers who need to use costly advertising to
reach buyers. We show that the advertising intensities are lower if there are
too many sellers or too many buyers, and higher if the number of sellers and
number of buyers are balanced. In a large market, the equilibrium matching rate
for a seller depends only on the market tightness. In this sense, the standard
directed search models are robust to having sellers send imperfect costly signals.
We also compare different trading protocols and find that equilibrium advertising
intensities are higher under auctions than under price-posting. Most interestingly,
when the market informativeness is endogenized, the equilibrium price and the
equilibrium measure of informed buyers can positively co-move even in the large
market.
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8 Appendix I
Proof of Lemma 1.
By definition, λ is the expected probability that a buyer selects a non-deviator
contingent on receiving this seller’s ads. A buyer is believed to observe the
deviator’s ads with probability µi(I). Therefore, Λ can be written as
Λ = µi(I1)
M−2∑
k=0
[(
M − 2
k
)
· (qˆ)k · (1 − qˆ)M−2−k · 1 − σi(I, µ)
k + 1
]
+
(
1 − µi(I)) M−2∑
k=0
[(
M − 2
k
)
· (qˆ)k · (1 − qˆ)M−2−k ·
( 1
k + 1
)]
.
(47)
The size of some other buyer’s information set, I, is given by k + 2 if ri is observed
and k + 1 otherwise. The first term is the expected probability that a buyer is
believed to observe the deviating price ri and some other non-deviating prices r
including seller l’s, but selects seller l. The second term is the expected probability
that a buyer is believed not to observe ri but some other prices r including l’s, and
finally selects seller l. When a buyer observes the k prices in total including the
deviating price, he selects a non-deviator with probability (1 − σi(I, µ))/(k − 1).
Otherwise, he selects a non-deviator with probability 1/k. Use the following fact
for the second term
M−2∑
k=0
[(
M − 2
k
)
· (qˆ)k · (1 − qˆ)M−2−k · 1
k + 1
]
=
1 − (1 − qˆ)M−1
(M − 1)qˆ , (48)
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and the fact σi(I, µ) = 1 when ri is the only element in I, we obtain
Λ = µi(I1)
M−2∑
k=0
[(
M − 2
k
)
· (qˆ)k · (1 − qˆ)M−2−k · 1
k + 1
]
− µi(I1)
M−2∑
k=0
[(
M − 2
k
)
· (qˆ)k · (1 − qˆ)M−2−k · σi(I, µ)
k + 1
]
− µi(I1)
M−2∑
k=0
[(
M − 2
k
)
· (qˆ)k · (1 − qˆ)M−2−k · 1
k + 1
]
+
1 − (1 − qˆ)M−1
(M − 1)qˆ
= − µi(I1)
M−2∑
k=0
[(
M − 2
k
)
· (qˆ)k · (1 − qˆ)M−2−k · σi(I, µ)
k + 1
]
+
1 − (1 − qˆ)M−1
(M − 1)qˆ
= − µi(I1)
 1(M − 1)qˆ
M−1∑
k=0
[(
M − 1
k
)
· (qˆ)k · (1 − qˆ)M−1−k · σi(I, µ)
]
− (1 − qˆ)
M−1
(M − 1)qˆ

+
1 − (1 − qˆ)M−1
(M − 1)qˆ
= − µi(I1)Λi
(M − 1)qˆ +
1 − (1 − µi(I1))(1 − qˆ)M−1
(M − 1)qˆ .
Note that in the transformation from the second equation to the third equation, we
use the fact that σi(I, µ) = 1 if k = 0. Rearrange the equation, the result in Lemma
1 follows.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider the potential deviator seller i’s maximization problem (20). The first-
order condition w.r.t ri is given by
∂(qiΛi)
∂ri
=
−qiΛi(1 − qiΛi)
(NqiΛi − 1)(1 − ri) + (1 − qiΛi) . (49)
A symmetric equilibrium requires that seller i does not have a profitable deviation
from the equilibrium strategy (r∗, q∗). Under a passive belief setting, µiI is not
affected by the deviating reserve price ri. Also, buyers’ belief should be correct on
the equilibrium path, i.e., µi(I) = qˆ = q∗. Substitute in these expressions, we obtain
qiΛi|ri=r∗,qi=q∗ =
1 − (1 − q∗)M
M
.
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Take the total derivative of (17) and substitute in ri, qi, we derive
∂(qiΛi)
∂ri
|ri=r∗,qi=q∗ =
−(M − 1)2 − (M − 1) (1 − q∗)M
M2(N − 1)(1 − r∗) .
Substitute the above two expressions into the first-order condition, the equilibrium
reservation price r∗ can then be written as a function in term of q∗
r∗ =
(N − 1) [1 − (1 − q∗)M]
M(M − 1) + (N −M) [1 − (1 − q∗)M] (50)
To derive the equilibrium advertising rate, differentiate the objective function
w.r.t qi. Notice that Λi does not depend on qi. We obtain
riNΛi
(
1 − qiΛi)N−1 + (1 − ri)N(N − 1)qiΛ2i (1 − qiΛi)N−2 = C′(qi) (51)
Let µi(I) = qˆ = q∗ and ri = r = r∗. Substituting qiΛi|ri=r∗,qi=q∗ = 1−(1−q
∗)M
M into this
first-order condition, the equilibrium advertising rate q∗ is characterized by
r∗N[1−(1−q
∗)M]
Mq∗
[
1 − 1−(1−q∗)MM
]N−1
+
(1 − r∗)N(N−1)[1−(1−q∗)M]2M2q∗
[
1 − 1−(1−q∗)MM
]N−2
= C′(q∗). (52)
Let τ = 1 − (1 − q)M and φ = N/M, this condition further simplifies to
r∗
φτ
q∗
(
1 − τ
M
)N−1
+ (1 − r∗) φ(φ −
1
M )τ
q∗
(
1 − τ
M
)N−2
= C′(q∗). (53)
Existence: Note that the RHS of equation (53) is continuous over [0,1]. Further-
more, we have lim
q→0 τ/q = M and limq→1
τ/q = 1. The RHS goes to φ(φ − 1/M)M when
q goes to 0 and it goes to φ(1 − 1/M)N−2(r + φ − rφ − 1/M) when q goes to 1, where
r = (φ − 1/M)/(M + φ − 2). Therefore, the RHS of (53) is bounded. Then, C′(q)≥0
and C′(1) = ∞ guarantee that a solution q∗ exists.
Uniqueness: We rewrite the RHS of condition (53) as
r(q)A(q) + [1 − r(q)]B(q).
where A(q) = φτq
(
1 − τM
)N−1
and B(q) =
φ(φ− 1M )τ
q
(
1 − τM
)N−2
. Differentiate it, we have
r′(q)[A(q) − B(q)] − r(q)A′(q) + [1 − r(q)]B′(q).
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The second and third terms are both strictly negative when M ≥ 1 and N > 2.
To see this, notice that both τ/q and 1 − (τ/M) are decreasing in q. Especially,
d(τ/q)/dq =
[
(1 − q)M + Mq(1 − q)M−1 − 1
]
/q2 < 0 because the numerator is negative
when 0 < q < 1. In the first term, [A(q) − B(q)] is non-positive if
M + 1 − τ −N ≥ 0.
Since τ ∈ [0, 1], this is indeed true if N≥M+1. Moreover, given that r′(q) is positive,
the RHS of condition (53) is negative if M + 1 − τ − N ≥ 0. For strictly increasing
C′(q), C′(0) = 0 and C′(1) = +∞, there will be an unique intersection between C′(q)
and r(q)A(q) + [1 − r(q)]B(q), and hence the equilibrium advertising intensity is
unique.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Differentiate both sides of (24) in φ, we have
φe−φ(2 − φ) = C′′(q)q + C′(q) dq
dφ
.
Then,
dq
dφ
=
q2φe−φ(2 − φ)
C′′(q)q + C′(q)
.
The result follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 4.
The first-order conditions w.r.t pi and qi are given by
1 − (1 − qiΛi)N + piNqi (1 − qiΛi)N−1 dΛidpi = 0, (54)
piNΛi
(
1 − qiΛi)N−1 − C′(qi) = 0. (55)
From the indifference condition (29) and Lemma 1, we obtain
dΛ
dp
=
(1 − ρ)(1 − ρN)
q(1 − p)
[
M
M−1 (1 − ρN) − MNM−1ρN−1(1 − ρ)
] , (56)
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where ρ = 1− qΛ = 1− (τ/M). Substitute dΛ/dp into (54) and set qi = q∗ and pi = p.
Also the correct but passive belief on the equilibrium path requires µi(I) = q∗,∀I.
we get the equilibrium price p∗ in term of q∗
p∗ =
M(1 − ρN) − ρN−1(1 − ρ)MN
M(1 − ρN) −NρN−1(1 − ρ) .
Then, (55) can be written as
p∗NΛ∗
(
1 − q∗Λ∗)N−1 = C′(q∗). (57)
When q → 0, Λ → 1 and p → 1. Thus, the LHS of (57) converges to N. When
q→ 1, Λ→ 1/M and p converges to a positive number
ps =
(M − 1) − (M−1M )Mφ(M − 1 + Mφ)
(M − 1) − (M−1M )Mφ(M − 1 + φ)
∈ (0, 1).
The LHS of (57) then converges to φps. Since the marginal cost function C′(q) > 0,
a interior solution q∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Take the limits of (30) and (31), we obtain (33) and (34). Totally differentiate (34)
w.r.t φ and rearrange, we have
dq
dφ
=
e−φ f (φ)[
C′′(q)q + C′(q)
]
(1 − eφ)2 , (58)
where
f (φ) = 1 + (1 − φ)
[
e2φ + φ − 2eφ(1 + φ)
]
. (59)
The sign of dq/dφ then depends solely on the sign of f (φ) as both e−φ and C′′(q)q +
C′(q) are positive. When φ is small, (1−φ)
[
e2φ + φ − 2eφ(1 + φ)
]
is bounded below
1. However, after φ reaches 1.669, f (φ) becomes positive as e2φ increases much
faster than 2(1 − φ)eφ and 1 − φ is negative. This makes f (φ) negative. Then,
dq/dφ > 0 when φ ≤ 1.669 and dq/dφ < 0 when φ ≥ 1.669. The advertising
intensity is of inverted-U shape in the market tightness φ.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Rearrange equations (24) and (34) so that the RHS of both equations are qC′(q),
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and the LHS of (24) is then φ2e−φ while the LHS of (34) is φe
−φ(1−e−φ−φe−φ)
1−e−φ . For the
same level of q, the LHS of (24) is larger than the LHS of (34) if
φ ≥ (1 − e
−φ − φe−φ)
1 − e−φ .
This is equivalent to
φ − 1 − e−φ ≥ 0.
First notice that, when φ = 0, this weak inequality holds as equality. Also, φ −
1 − e−φ is continuous in φ. Since
d
dφ
(φ − 1 − e−φ) = 1 − e−φ > 0,
we know that the inequality holds for any φ > 0. Since qC′(q) is strictly increasing
in q, the equilibrium advertising intensity under auction mechanism is strictly
higher for any φ.
Proof of Corollary 1.
Sellers’ expected revenues are the same under price-posting and auction, but
Proposition 6 shows sellers invest more in advertising under auction, the result
then follows.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Notice that the equilibrium price p∗ = 1 − φeφ−1 is strictly increasing in φ. Combine
this with Proposition 5, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 7.
Define ϕ = q†/q∗. First suppose φ > 1 and ϕ > 1 hold. Then we must have
e−ϕφ < φe−φ as e−ϕφ is decreasing in ϕ. Compare the LHS of (44) and (41), we must
have
C′(q†)q† < C′(q∗)q∗.
Since C′(q)q is strictly increasing in q, we have q† < q∗. This contradicts with
ϕ = q†/q∗ > 1. Then, when φ > 1, q† < q∗. Similarly, we can prove that when φ < 1,
ϕ > 1. Finally, when φ = 1, q∗ must equal to q†, given that C′(·) is non-deceasing.
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Proof of Proposition 8.
The simplest way to check the claim in Proposition 8 is to set q∗ = q† and see if there
exists a single φ∗ which satisfies equation (43), (44), (45) and (46). When q∗ = q†,
(44) coincides with (46) if and only if φ = 1. When φ = 1, (43) can be satisfied only
when k = 1/e. Therefore, q∗ = q†, φ∗ = φ† only when k = 1/e.
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